When William James (1890) wrote about the unique problem of studying self and identity, he immediately noted the peculiar blurring of the otherwise clear demarcation between the knower a nd the known. The object of scrutiny, the self, was also the agent doing the scrutinizing. This illicit merger of the knower and the known has created an epistemological unease that philosophers have worried about and psychologists have either ignored or t urned into an assumption so as to ignore (see Klein, Chapter 28, this vol ume).
The human ability for self-awareness and selfreflection is so unique that tapping it as a primary source of information about mind and socia l behavior has come at the expense of confronting the severe problems of the knower also being the known and of using introspection as the primary path to discovery. In this chapter, we argue that at least one circumstance can explicitly disenta ngle the knower from the known in the study of self: when it becomes explicit that the self-asknower does not have introspective access to the self-as-known. When knowledge about oneself resides in a form that is inaccessible to consciousness, a happy situation arises of requiring other mea ns of access. When such indirect methods of access show patterns of self-knowledge and self-affect that are dissociated from what is obtained introspectively, we have a psychologically intriguing moment: Why are they not consistent? Which one is true, and according to what criteria? What does each predict independently? What is the developmental trajectory of both? Are they malleable? In this chapter, we focus on states of unconscious thought a nd feeling about the self-those ma rked by a lack of conscious awareness, control, intention, and self-reflection.
Over the past two decades, the study of implicit social cognition has created new paradigms for studying several traditional fields (for reviews, see Bargh, 2007; Devos, 2008; Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Petty, Fazio, & Briiiol, 2008; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007) . At first sight, this trend might seem to say little about the topic of self and identity. Indeed, it is a common assumption that studies of self centrally involve experiences of reflexive consciousness (Baumeister, 1998) : Individuals reflect on their experiences, self-consciously evaluate the contents of consciousness, a nd introspect about the causes and meaning of things. In addition, the self is of ten viewed as playing a consciously active role in making mea ning, implementing choices, pursuing goals, and initiating action. Studies that focus on i AWARENloSS, COGNffl()N, AND REGULATION le u nconscious or a utomatic modes of thinking and feel ing, when applied to self and identity processes, question these assu mptions, and they do so based on the discovery of mental acts t ha t are folly mea ningfu l and lawfu l but that appea r to arise without introspective access or deliberative thought.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of research on the implicit social cognition of self a nd identity. No attempt is made to review the literature at ha nd exha ustively; rather, we focus on reflections of self a nd identity in a pa rticular socia l context-the context in which thoughts a nd feelings about oneself are shaped by membership in a larger collective, and in which such thoughts and feelings go beyond the self as ta rget to represent a nd shape a view of the collective. Such a focus places us in the respecta ble compa ny of others who also assume or demonstrate that the individual self is mea ningfully considered in reference to social entities that transcend the individual self (Cooley, 1902 ; Hogg, Chapter 23, th is volu me; Mead, 1934; Turner, Oakes, Hasla m, & McGa rty, 1994; Walsh & Ba naji, 1997) . We limit our coverage to aspects of the sel f that emerge when (1) viewed i n the context of social group membershi ps, and (2) measured via thoughts a nd feelings that are not consciously controllable or withi n awa reness. We begin with resea rch pa radigms that link the study of self with social grou p and proceed to specific ana lyses of basic preference for the ingroup a nd other attributes associated with the self. We then include ana lyses of implicit self and identity processes as viewed in resea rch on selfeval uation, performa nce and behavior, and goal pursuit. In the next major section, we attend to the top-down influence of societa l and cultural factors on the construction of implicit self a nd identity. Together, the research we review reveals the plasticity of the self as it is shaped by the dema nds of social group a nd culture.
The term implicit is used to refer to processes tha t occur outside conscious awareness. Evaluations of one's self, for example, may be i nfl uenced by group membership, even though one is not aware of such an influence. A female college student who strongly identifies with her gender may u nknowi ngl y incorporate traditional gender role expectations about pa renthood into her self-concept, while consciously identif ying with higher education (Devos, Bla nco, Rico, & Dunn, 2008) . There are multiple ways in which one may be unawa re of the source of i nfluence on thoughts, feelings, a nd behavior (Gawronski, Hof ma nn, & Wilbur, 2006) . For example, one may in some circumsta nces be unawa re of the existence of the source of influence, whereas in other circumstances one may consciously a nd accurately perceive the source of infl uence, wh ile being unaware of its causal role in self-evaluation.
The term implicit is also applied to processes that occur without conscious control (Payne, 2005) . Here, the circumsta nces are such that one may be perfectly aware of the contingencies that connect a particular stimu lus to a response but be una ble to change or reverse the direction of the thought, feeling, or action. A woma n may deliberately disagree with roma ntic fantasies about men as chivalric rescuers of women and, at the same time, be unable to control her automatic endorsement of fa ntasies consistent with traditional gender rol_e expectations (Rudma n & Heppen, 2003) . Although empirical i nvestigations focus on one or another of these aspects of unconscious social cognition, as well as on those that elude intention and selfreflection, we use the term implicit here to encompass both the processes that occur without conscious awareness and those that occur without conscious control.
Self and Social Group
Since at least the 1970s, the self-concept bas been profitably stud ied by representi ng it as a n information structure with empirically tractable cognitive and affective features, From such a theoretical vantage point came the idea that the self-concept, like other mental representations (e.g., memory), could be viewed as potentially operating in automatic mode, and that aspects of self may be hidden from introspective awareness, as are aspects of perception and memory.
Research in the America n social cognition tradition focused on the int rapersonal a nd interpersona l aspects of self and identity, whereas another tradition, with Europea n roots, emphasi zed the association between self and socia l group, resulting in an intergrou p emphasis (see Hogg, Chapter 23, th is volu me). The latter's most a rticu- (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) , holds that under pa rticular cond itions, group members perceive themselves as exem pla rs of the group rather tha n as u niq ue ind ividuals. In this mode, they high l ight the simila ri ties between themselves and other ingroup members, and they apply characteristics typical of the ingroup to the self (sel f-stereotyping). In other words, the representations of self and ingroup become inextrica bly l inked. Until recently, tests of this hypothesis mai n ly involved self-report measures (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996; Simon, Pa ntaleo, & Mummendey, 1995) . However, a nu m ber of empirical investigations have revealed that the processes by which the ingroup may be said to become part a nd parcel of the self also can operate at an implicit level.
Ad apting a pa rad igm developed by A ron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson (1991) , Smith and Henry (1996) examined people's psychological ties to signi fica nt ingroups. Pa rticipants were asked to rate themselves, thei r ingroup, and an outgroup on a list of traits. Next, they indicated, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether each trait was self-descriptive or not. Self-descriptiveness judgments were faster for traits on which participa nts matched their ingroup than for traits on which they mismatched. On the contrary, no such facilitation was observed for traits rated as matching or mismatching the outgroup. Th is finding has been ta ken to illustrate that the ingroup becomes pa rt of the representation of oneself. Using a similar procedure, a follow-up study demonstrated that the reverse was also true (Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999) : Characteristics of the self influenced evaluations of the ingroup, in that participants were faster to make ingroup descriptiveness judgments for tra its that matched their self-perceptions. Together, these results support the idea of a menta l fusion of the self a nd social group (see also Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000) .
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is a technique developed to assess the strength of implicit associ ations between concepts (e.g., self, group) and attributes (e.g., evaluation of good-bad, specific traits), a nd it also has been used to study implicit self and identity. The assumption underlying the technique is 157 that the more closely rel ated a concept and an attribute are (e.g., ingroup and good, outgroup a nd bad), the more q u ickly i nformation representing the concept and the attribute shou ld be pai red (for a review of conceptual and methodologica l aspects of t his technique, see Nosek, Greenwa ld, & Ba na ji, 2007) .
Recent experiments have used this technique and va riations of it to investigate the strength of self + grou p association, referri ng to this pa i ri ng as a measu re of automatic identification with the social group. For example, Devos and Ba na ji (2005) used this procedu re to capture the strength of implicit nationa l identity among citizens of t he United States. Pa rticipa nts were asked to categorize, as quick l y as possi ble, sti m u l i presented on a computer screen. Some stimu l i were pictu res of America n or foreign symbols (e.g., flags, coi ns, maps, mon u ments), whereas other stimuli were pronou ns frequently used to designate ingroups (e.g., we, ourselves) or outgroups (e.g., they, other ). Participa nts completed this task twice. In one case, America n symbols were pa ired with words representing the i ng rou p (e.g., we, ourselves ), and foreign symbols were com bined with words representing the outgroup (e.g., they, other). In another case, America n sym bols were com bined wit h outgroup words, and foreign sym bols were paired with ingroup words. Resu I ts indicated that participants performed the categorization task more quick ly when America n symbols and ingroup words shared the same response key. In other words, it was easier to associate America n symbols with words such as we or ourselves rather tha n with they or other. America n symbols may be seen here as automatically evoking belonging a nd implyi ng tha t, at least when una ble consciously to control their responses, this sample of Americans identi fled with their national group.
In addition, such self + group associations can be assessed for mu ltiple cu ltural identities. Using the same tech nique, Devos (2006) obtained patterns of self + cultu re associa tions indicative of a n i mpl ici t bicu ltu ral identity: Mexica n America n and Asia n American college students strongly identified with both American cu lture and their cu ltures of origin (Mexica n or Asia n cultu re). When the two cultures were pitted against I. AWARE N ESS, COG N ITION, ANO REG ULATION one another, respondents found it more difficu lt to pai r "me" words with stimuli associated with either culture.
With similar methodologies, other empirica l investigations have demonstrated implicit associations between self a nd attributes, roles, or domains stereotypical of gender categories (e.g., Greenwald & Farnha m, 2000; Lindgren, Shoda, & George, 2007) . For instance, automatic associations between self and the concept "math" for men and the concept "arts" for women have been obtained repeatedly (Nosek, Ba naji, & Greenwald, 2002) . Interestingly, identification with math among women (who initially displayed a wea k identification with this domain) increased when they were trained to approach (rather than avoid) math as pa rt of an experimental task ( Kawaka mi, Steele, Cifa, Philis, & Dovidio, 2008) . These implicit associations between self and group stereotypes also extend to negative stereotypes about ingroups. For example, using a sequential subliminal priming task, researchers have shown that women and Europea n America ns implicitly associated the self with ingroup stereotypical traits but not outgroup stereotypical traits, and both groups implicitly self-stereotyped on negative ingroup t raits (e.g., dependent a nd moody for women; snobby and materialistic for Eu ropea n America ns) as much as they d id on positive ingroup traits (e.g., caring and compassionate for women; educated a nd successful for Europea n Americans; Lun, Sinclair, & Cogburn, 2009 ). In addition, Lane, Mitchell, and Banaji (2005) have shown that implicit identification with a new ingroup could occur quickly and without extensive contact with the group. As predicted, Yale students showed stronger implicit identity with Ya le as an institution (rather tha n with Har vard), but strength of implicit identity was equally strong among those who had been on campus for a few days and those who had been on campus for one yea r or longer. These findings indicate that group mem bership comes to be automatically associated with self, and that people automatically endorse stereotypical attributes of their group as also being self-descriptive.
Recent neuroimaging findings lend further support to the far-reaching influences of self-other lin kages. For instance, Mitchell, Macrae, a nd Ba naji (2006) showed that distinct regions of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) are activated when individuals are asked to make inferences about the opinions, likes, and dislikes of group members whose political views are similar versus dissimilar to self. More precisely, when selfother overlap could be assumed, inferences about the target's views engaged a region of ventral mPFC associated with self-referential thought, whereas inferences about a dissimilar other activated a more dorsal region of mPFC. Follow-up research revealed that conscious attempts to adopt another person's perspective also prompted individuals to engage cognitive processes typically reserved for introspection (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 2008) .
A Preference for lngroups
The links between self and ingroup are not only visible in implicit knowledge and thought but also present in measures of attitude or evaluation. Tajfel (1974) emphasized this point when he defined "social identity as that part of an individua l's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significa nce attached to that membership" (p. 69). A large body of resea rch shows that people evaluate ingroup members more favorably than outgroup members (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) , and we examine those studies that used measures of implicit attitude or evaluation. The literature on implicit attitudes clearly suggests that groups unconsciously or automatically trigger more positive affective reactions when they are associated to the self. Assessments of ethnic attitudes without perceivers' awareness or control consistently reveal that European America ns have more positive feelings toward European Americans tha n toward African Americans (e.g., Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Bana ji, 2000; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) . Research also shows:; that undergraduate students hold a more fa.. vora ble attitude toward the category "young" than toward the category "old" (e.g., Perdue & Gurtma n, 1990 ; Rud man, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999 Nezlek, and Banaji (2004) have shown implicit" positive associations to the category white (rather than black), rich (rather than poor), American (rather than foreign), straight (rather than gay), and Christian (rather than Jewish) among students known to be white, American, and Christian, a majority of whom were also assu med to be high on the social class dimension a nd to be heterosexual. These researchers have taken the extra step of claiming that these implicit preferences do not develop in isolation, and that an individual difference marks the pattern: Those who show higher preference for one ingroup also show higher preference for all other ingroups; that is, they assert that there is evidence for an implicit ethnocentrism dimension.
In most of the research described, researchers have assessed the implicit attitudes of only people belonging to one particular group. Of the few studies that measured both sides, symmetry has been found under some circumsta nces. For instance, Greenwald and colleagues (1998) reported data from both Japanese Americans and Korea n Americans, each of whom showed a more positive implicit attitude toward their own ethnic group. The level of immersion in Asian culture moderated this pattern of implicit preferences. More precisely, participants who were immersed in their particular Asian culture (i.e., had a high proportion of family members and acquaintances from that culture and were familiar with the language) showed greater ingroup preference. In another study, depending on their religious af filiation, individuals exhibited an implicit preference for Christian or Jewish people (Rudman et al., 1999) .
In summary, implicit preferences for the ingroup a re characteristic of a wide variety of groups (affiliations with nation, state, and city; school and sports team; family and friends). Interestingly, implicit ingroup favoritism extends to evaluations and perceptions of other ingroup members' behaviors. For instance, the term implicit ingroup metafavoritism was coined to account for the fact that people implicitly preferred an ingrou p member who displayed ingroup bias, while verbally endorsing the behavior of an egali-159 tarian ingroup member (Castelli, Tomelleri, & Zogmaister, 2008) . In addition, people tend to describe positive behaviors in more abstract language terms ("X is helpful") when performed by an ingrou p member tha n when performed by an outgroup mem ber ("X gave them directions to go to the station"), and the opposite holds for negative behaviors ( Fra nco & Maass, 1996; Ka rpinski & von Hippe!, 1996; Maass, Salvi, A rcuri, & Semin, 1989; von Hippe!, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997) .
The tendency to favor the ingrou p attitudinally (e.g., along a good-bad dimension) sometimes u nderlies implicit stereotyping (e.g., the assignment of speci fic qua l ities that may also va ry i n evaluation). For example, both men and women hold simila r impl icit gender stereotypes but they exhibit them to a stronger extent when they reflect favora bly on their own group (Rudma n, Green wa ld, & McGhee, 2001). Ma le pa rticipa nts are more likely to di fferentiate men and women with respect to an attribute such as power, whereas female pa rticipa nts a re more likely to do so on a trai t such as wa rmth. In other words, each group emphasizes stereotypes in a self-favora ble direction.
Usi ng measu res of consciously accessi ble cognition, the ingroup bias has been shown to emerge under minimal conditions: The mere categori zation of individuals into two distinct groups el icits a preference for the ingroup ( Diehl, 1990; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) . There is now evidence that a mini mal social categorization is suf ficient to activate positive attitudes automatica lly or unconsciously toward self-related groups and negative or neutral attitudes towa rd nonself-related groups. For example, Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtma n, and Tyler (1990) found that pa rticipants responded faster to pleasa nt words when primed with ingrou p pronouns (e.g., we or us) rather than with outgroup pronouns (e.g., they or them), even though they were unaware of the grou p-designating primes. Thus, the use of words referring to ingroups or outgrou ps might unconsciously perpetuate intergroup biases. More recently, Otten and Went u ra (1999) showed tha t neutral words automatically acqu ired an affective connotation, simply by introducing them as group labels and by relating one of them to participa nts' self-concepts. The selfrelated group label fu nctioned equ ivalently to positive primes, whereas the other label functioned simila rly to negative primes. In other words, as soon as a word designated an ingroup, it acquired positive connotation, whereas words referring to a n outgroup immediately conveyed a negative valence.
Even when groups are fictional a nd there are no ingrou p-outgroup references (e.g., memorizi ng the na me of four mem bers of a fictitious group), people sponta neously identified with a nd formed positive opinions about these novel groups, and this implicit partisanshi p extended to nonhuma n objects (made-up car brands; Greenwa ld, Pickrell, & Farn ham, 2002; Pinter & Greenwald, 2004) . These experiments suggest that the ingroup bi as occurs automatically and unconsciously under minimal conditions (see also Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000) .
Given the increasing body of evidence that social identity processes can operate outside of conscious awareness and control, one might wonder about the developmental process of implicit identity formation a nd ingroup bias. Although implicit identity development has not been studied directly, we can draw from the literature on implicit attitude formation to inform our views about implicit identity development. Most of ten, implicit social cognition has been conceptualized as the result of a slow lea rning process through long-term experiences, such that implicit attitudes and beliefs emerge over time as people detect a nd internalize regula rities in their social world ( Rud man, 2004) . However, theories of slow learning of implicit social cognition fail to accou nt for fast-toform and fast-to-sta bilize implicit identities, such as the aforementioned study that fou nd college students very rapidly develop an implicit identity associated with their school (Lane et a l., 2005 ; see also Gregg, Seibt, & . ln addition, researchers have documented implicit intergroup biases in children as young as 3 years old. For exa mple, in a cross-sectional study of Europea n American children using the IAT, 6-yea r-olds, 10-year-olds, a nd adults displayed equally strong implicit pro-white-a nti-black preferences ( Ba ron & Ba naji, 2006) . In another cross-sectional study, white British child ren ages 6-16 displayed equally strong i mplicit pro-white-a nti-black preferences (Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005) . To understa nd the sources of these intergroup attitudes, Castelli, Zogmaister, and Tomelleri (2009) examined implicit and explicit racial attitudes of 3-to 6-yea r-old white Italian children and their parents. The pa rents' self-reported racia l attitudes were not related to their children's responses, but the mothers' implicit raci al preferences predicted their ch ildren's playmate preferences a nd attributions of negative a nd positive traits to a black chil d. As a whole, these studies suggest that even for young child ren, whose attitudes are constrained by thei r cognitive abilities, group perceptions are i nfluenced by significant adults and their surrou nding social environment (see also Olson, Ba na ji, Dweck, & Spel ke, 2006). Most nota bly, these findings are consistent across cultu res exa mined thus far, but only for members of the socia lly advantaged or domina nt group, suggesti ng that implicit social cogn ition emerges early in life due to child ren's ability to make ingroup-outgroup d istinctions and their sensitivity i:o social hierarch ies within the larger socia l context (Dunham, Baron, & Ba naji, 2008) .
In terms of implicit identity development, the implicit ingroup-outgroup disti nctions evident in young child ren proba bly serve as a basis for the implicit associations between self and different socia l groups. In tu rn, these impl icit associations may be one of the building blocks for social identity as Erikson (1959) conceptualized it: The process of identity development necessa rily involves both conscious (e.g., sense of ind ividual identity) and unconscious (e.g., striving for continu· ity of personal character) components. Even when identity is conceptua lized as a process of conscious, deliberate self-evaluation and self-reflection (e.g., McAda ms, 2001), implicit self + group associations acqu ired in early chi ldhood may influence the identities that people choose to explore and the va l ue they assign to the groups to which they be· long.
Preferences for Self Extend to Attributes Associated with Self
Evidence for implicit ingroup favoritism is reminiscent of research showing that the mere ownership of an object or its associa· tion to the self is a condition sufficient to enhance its attractiveness. Nuttin (1985) found that when individuals were asked to choose a preferred letter from each of several pairs consisting of one alphabet letter from their names and one not, they tended reliably to prefer alpha bets that constit ute their names. This finding, known as the name letter ef fect (NLE) has been replicated in many countries and with samples from very different cultures (e.g., Albers, Rotteveel, & Dijksterhuis, 2009; Anseel & Duyck, 2009; Kitayama & Ka rasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1987) .
In order to test whether the preference for name letters depended on a conscious decision, Nuttin (1985) invited participants to search for a meaningful pattern in the pairs of letters presented. Despite the fact that no time limit was imposed and that a moneta ry award was promised to anyone who could correctly identif y the prearra nged pattern of letters, not a single participant could come up with the solution. This finding supports the idea that the NLE does not stem from a conscious recognition of the connection between the attribute and one's self. In addition, the NLE does not seem to be a remainder of the positive mastery affect or the intense positive emotions following initial success on a socially valued skill experienced by most people when they first succeed in reading or writing their own names (Hoorens, Nuttin, Herman, & Pavakan u n, 1990; Hoorens & Todorova, 1988) , or to be due to an enhanced subjective frequency of ownname letters compared with non-name letters (Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993) . At present, the most convincing interpretation of this effect is that the preference for letters in one's name reflects an unconscious preference for self, and its generality is shown through research on preference for other self-related information, such as birth dates over other numbers (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & va n Knippenberg, 2001) .
Broadening this line of work, research shows that the implicit positive evaluation of self and associated attributes also influences where people choose to live and what they choose to do for a living. Across a dozen studies, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones (2002) found that people are more likely to live in cities or states and to choose careers whose na mes share letters with their own first or last na mes. For example, a person 161 named Louis is disproportionately likely to live in St. Louis, and individuals named Dennis or Den ise are overrepresented among dentists (see also Anseel & Duyck, 2008 . Correlational a nd experimental studies reveal that this implicit egotism extends to the selection of romantic partners: People were implicitly more attracted to others who shared their initials or birth date numbers than those who did not (Jones, Pelha m, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004) .
Interestingly, archival and experimental data indicate that this implicit preference for the self genera lizes to negatively va lenced events, even when people deliberately strive for success (Nelson & Simmons, 2007) . For insta nce, baseball players whose name start with the letter K (the letter used in Major League Baseball to indicate a strikeout) were more likely to strike out than other players, and lawyers whose names start with A and B (letters associated with better academic performance) attended better law schools than lawyers whose names start with C and D (letters associated with worse academic performance). Together, these findings on the NLE and implicit egotism suggest that personal choices may be constrained by linkages to self that are not noticed, not consciously sought, and even surprising. They reveal introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) effects of the self-attitude on evaluations of associated objects (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) .
Balancing Self and Social Group
Work reviewed so far highlights the cognitive and affective ties between self a nd group memberships, a nd stresses the fact that individuals are not necessarily fully aware of these bounds on their thinking, or that they are aware but una ble to control their operation. Now we turn to the relationships among the cognitive and affective components that ma ke up the self system. Several theories predict some consistency between constructs that represent self and social group. For example, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986 ) assumes some interrelations among self-esteem, group identification, and ingroup bias. According to the theory, social identification serves as a source of self-esteem.
Generally speaking, individuals strive to maintain or increase their self-esteem. They can derive a sense of self-worth through favorable i ntergroup comparisons. Thus, selfesteem should be enhanced by membership in a valued group, a nd strong identification with the group should go hand in hand with positive evaluation of the ingroup. Evidence for the role of self-esteem in intergroup compa risons is mixed (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Brown, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998) . Moreover, support for the idea that there should be a positive correlation between group identification and ingroup favoritism is not overwhelming ( Brewer, 2001; Brown, 2000) . The absence of expected relationships has led to examinations of these const ructs using implicit measures. For example, Knowles and Peng (2005) found that the strength of the automatic association between self and whites (ingroup identification) was posi tivel y correlated with the intensity of the pro-white implicit attitude (ingroup favoritism) a nd also accounted for the extent to which individua ls possessed a restrictive representation of their ethnic group by showing a reluctance to categorize mixed-race individuals as white (ingroup overexclusiveness).
Based on the growi ng body of evidence regardi ng implicit processes involved in the self system, Greenwald, Banaji, and colleagues (2002) proposed a u nified theory of social cognition that predicts patterns of interrelations among group identification, self-esteem, and ingrou p attitude. Their approach draws its inspiration from theories of affective-cognitive consistency that domi nated social psychology in the 1960s (Abelson et al., 1968) a nd allows them to integrate a range of otherwise isolated findings obtained with the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) . This approach is based on the assumption that social knowledge (including knowledge about oneself ) can be represented as a n associative structure.
From this point of view, the structure of the self is a network of associations: The self is linked to traits, groups, concepts, or eva luati ons. A core principle of the theory is that attitudes toward self and concepts closely associated with self (i.e., components of self-concept or identity) tend to be of similar valence. In other words, according to the balance-congruity principle, if someone holds a positive attitude towa rd the self and considers that a particular concept (e.g., a group, an attribute, or a domain) is part of his or her self-concept, this person should also hold a positive attitude toward that particular concept.
A study on women's gender identity illustrates this principle. For women, one would typica lly expect an association between self and the concept "female" (gender identity or self + female), and a positive association toward the self (positive self-esteem or self + good). Based on the ba lance-congruity principle, these two links should also be accompa nied by a third link: a positive association towa rd the concept "female" (liking for female or female + good). More precisely, the strength of the positive attitude toward "fema le" should be a joint (or i nteractive) function of the strength of the associations between self and positive, and between self and female. Data supported this prediction: As gender identity increased, so did the positive relation between self-esteem and liking for women (Greenwald, Banaji, et al., 2002 ; see also Aidman & Carroll, 2003; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004) . Support for similar hypotheses has been obtai ned using a va riety of social groups and d iffering clusters of attributes that measure constructs such as attitude, stereotype, a nd self-esteem (e.g., Devos, Blanco, Rico, et al., 2008; Devos & Cruz Torres, 2007; Greenwald, Banaji, et al., 2002; Nosek et al., 2002) . For i nsta nce, the more college women identified with motherhood, the stronger the correlation between self-esteem a nd liking motherhood, but the more they identified with college education, the stronger the correlation between self-esteem and li king for college education (Devos, Diaz, Viera, & Du nn, 2007) . Interestingly, evidence for such balanced (si milarly valenced) identities has been obtained prima ril y when implicit measures of self and group identity are used, a nd it has appeared i n weaker form on measures of conscious affect and cognition (Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoff, in press ).
Relational and Contextual Self-Definitions
Having shown self and socia l group con· nections on attitude and beliefs, we turn to 8. hn plid t S01f ,rnd hk ntity resea rch demonstrating that shif ts in selfevaluation also occur without conscious intention. For example, the unconscious activation of significa nt others has implications for self-evaluation. Baldwin (1992) proposed that the internalization of relationships involves the development of relational schemas; these cognitive structures represent regularities in patterns of interpersonal interactions. Of ten, the sense of self can be derived from such well-learned scripts of interpersonal evaluations. In other words, activated relational schemas shape self-evaluative reactions, even when these schemas are primed below the level of awa reness. Indeed, subliminal exposure to the name of a critical versus an accepting significa nt other led participants to report more negative versus positive self-evaluations ( Baldwin, 1994) . Similarly, graduate students evaluated their own resea rch ideas less favora bly after being subliminally exposed to the disapproving face of their department chair rather than the approving face of another person (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990) . These effects occurred only when the prime was a significant other. For insta nce, Catholic participants rated themselves more negatively after exposure to the disapproving face of the Pope, but not after exposure to the disa pproving face of an unfamiliar person. In addition, if the Pope did not serve as a figure of authority, self-evaluation remained unaffected by the priming manipulation.
Unobtrusively making a social identity salient or changing the parameters of a social context can also influence the social self. For insta nce, Ha ines and Kray (2005) showed that women's identification with social power was a function of the context or social role to which they were assigned. More precisely, women assigned to a highpower group displayed stronger impl icit self + power associations than women assigned to a low-power group. Similarly, women assigned to a high-power role displayed a more masculine implicit self-definition tha n women assigned to a low-power role. In a study on men's gender self-concept, McCall and Dasgupta (2007) also found that subtly ma nipulating status in a socia l interaction changed automatic self-beliefs, but the dynamic was very different for men than for women: Men assigned to a low-status role nonconsciously cou nteracted this role 1 63 by exhibiting more leader-like self-beliefs than men placed in a high-stat us role. Also releva nt to the aims of this chapter, studies showed that priming the construct "equa lity" decreased implicit ingroup favoritism, whereas prim ing the construct "loyalty" enha nced it (Zogmaister, Arcuri, Castelli, & Smith, 2008) . In addition, contextual effects on implicit self-definitions were found for bilingual Latino college students (Devos, Blanco, Munoz, Dunn, & Ulloa, 2008): Pa rticipants who completed the IAT in English showed stronger identification with family than with school, but there was no d ifference in identification with these two constructs for those who completed the IAT in Spanish. Once again, the difference between the two language conditions ( English vs. Span ish) suggests that implicit identities are anchored in the pa rameters of the social context. Internalized expectations about one's social group can shape self-definitions even when they are unobtrusively activated or assessed.
Resea rch on implicit self-esteem also indicates that contextual variations can produce an effect on unconscious or automatic preferences. For example, DeHa rt and Pelham (2007) demonst rated in a 3-week diar y study that people with either low explicit self-esteem or low self-concept clarity (extent to which self-beliefs are clearly defined, internally consistent, and stable over time) were more likely to repor t lower implicit self-esteem on the days they reported more negative life events. These fluctuations in implicit self-esteem were not shown for people with high explicit self-esteem or high self-concept clarity. As another example, the NLE described earlier d id not occur af ter participa nts had received failure feedback on an alleged IQ test, but it reemerged once pa rticipants were given the opportunity to affirm a personally importa nt va lue (Koole, Smeets, va n K nippen berg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999) . Thus, it appears that a failure on an alleged intelligence test increases the accessibility of failure-related cognitions and reduces, at least tempora rily, pa rticipa nts' implicit self-esteem. Affi rming an important aspect of one's self-concept permits one to counteract the negative consequences of the feedback. Evaluative conditioning tasks have been shown to change implicit but not explicit self-esteem, whereas d irected, conscious thinking about the self altered ex- Together, these studies are in line with a growing body of research stressing that implicit associations are not fixed or rigid but relatively mallea ble (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) . Such work also illustrates the dyna mic nature of self-related processes (Markus & Wurf, 1987) . It is a fact of modern life that people belong to a range of social groups, both chosen and given. As societies become more heterogeneous, the opportunity for comparing and contrasting oneself to others will increase. Across time and situations, var ying identities may come forward or recede from consciousness. Effects that appea r to be u nsystematic and unpredictable may be quite lawfu l when unconscious social influences on self-evaluations are considered.
Performance and Behavior
If thoughts a nd feelings are tra nsformed by the activation of social group membership, behavior should be influenced as well. Yet because cognition and affect are much better understood components of psychology than behavior, studies of the latter have been less frequently reported. Perhaps for this reason, and because behavior is the "gold standa rd" in the behavioral sciences, studies that show the influence of social group on self-relevant behavior receive much attention. This is certa inly true of work on stereotype threat, situations in which the presence of a negative stereotype about one's group can ha ndicap the performance of members of the group (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002) . According to the proponents of this theoretical framework, when African American students perform a scholastic or intellectual task, they face the threat of confirming a negative stereotype about their group's intellect ual ability. This threat, it is speculated, interferes with intellectual functioning and can lead to detrimental impact on performa nce. Support for this argument has now been obtained in many experiments showing the influence of subtle activation of race/ethnicity, gender, class, and age distinctions on performa nce on standardized tests.
For example, Steele and Aronson (1995) found that stereotype threat can affect the performance of African American college students, who performed significantly worse than European Americans on a standardized test when the test was presented as diagnostic of their intellectual abilities. This effect did not occur when the test was presented as nondiagnostic of their ability. Other studies have demonstrated that women u nderperform on tests of mathematical a bilit y when the stereotype associated with their group was made salient (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999) . Shih, Pittinsky, and Am bady (1999) showed that activating gender identity or ethnic identity among Asia n American women shifted performa nces to be, respectively, inferior or superior on a math test. The manipulations producing these effects are often rather subtle. In some cases, it is sufficient to ask pa rticipa nts to indicate their group membership just prior to assessing their performance (Steele & Aronson, 1995) . In other cases, researchers have subliminally primed ·the negative stereotype, which then impaired subjects' performance (e.g., Levy, 1996; Wheeler, Jarvis, & Petty, 2001) . Interestingly, the ma nner in which the stereotype is activated in the testing situation determi nes its impact on performa nce (Shih, Ambady, Richeson, Fujita, & Gray, 2002) : Positive stereotypical expectations (e.g., "Asians are good at math") boosted targets' performances when these expectations were subtly activated, but not when they were blatantly activated. Other programs of resea rch demonstrate that stereotype threat effects occur through automatic, unconscious processing of stereotypereleva nt information relating to the performance situation. For example, women who implicitly associated "math" with "men" faster than "math" with "women" chronically experienced stereotype threat, even under "reduced threat" conditions (i.e., when they were told the math test was not diagnostic of their math ability); thus, they performed worse on math tests tha n women who did not implicitly hold stereotypical expectations (Kiefer & Sekaq uaptewa, 2007) .
Considerable evidence shows that the activation of trait constructs or stereotypes also can automatically or unconsciously influence social behavior (e.g., Bargh . When trait constructs or stereotypes are primed in the course of an unrelated task, individuals subsequently are more likely to act in line with the content of the primed trait construct or stereotype. For instance, priming the stereotype of "professors" or the trait "intelligent" enhanced performance on a general knowledge task (similar to Trivial Pursuit), while priming the stereotype of "soccer hooliga ns" or the trait "stupid" decreased performance on the test (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998). These effects are mediated by passive perceptual activity and are direct consequences of environmental events (priming manipulations). Indeed, ma nipulations or factors known to produce changes in perception also affected behaviors. For example, priming stereotypes of social categories produced assimilation effects like the ones we just described, whereas activating specific exemplars of the same categories led to contrast effects (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). More precisely, if participants were primed with the category "professors" (rather tha n "supermodels"), their own intellectual performa nce was enhanced (assimilation effect), but if they were primed with the exemplar "Albert Einstein" (rather tha n "Claudia Schiffer") a decrement in their performa nce resulted (contrast effect).
Other studies have demonstrated that individuals can fail to detect changes in their actions when those actions were induced implicitly. For example, people can be unaware that their behaviors shift in accordance with the behaviors of others. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) coined the term chameleon ef fect to describe the tendency to mimic unconsciously the postures, mannerisms, or facial expressions of one's interaction partners. They showed that the mere perception of a nother's behavior automatically increased the likelihood of engaging in that behavior oneself. Individuals were more likely to rub their faces or shake their feet if they interacted with someone who was performing that behavior. Such an effect is assumed to serve an adaptive function by facilitating smooth social interaction through increases in liking between individuals involved in the interactions; thus, it may occur automatically to aid these interactions. These findings a re consistent with the notion that there is a motivational component 165 to a utomatic social behavior. Cesario, Plaks, and Higgins (2006) a rgued that people use stored information about social groups to prepare for appropriate interactions with a group member. Automatic social behavior that stems from the activation of such information is the result of perceivers preparing for the interaction. Consistent wit h rhis point of view, participants primed with "gay men" (a negatively evaluated outgroup) displayed hostility, a behavior consistent with the motivated preparation account rather tha n the direct expression account of automatic behavior (which would have elicited stereotype-consistent behaviors, or passivity and femininity in response to this prime). In addition, participants primed with "elderly" were more likely to walk slowly if they d isplayed implicit liking for the elderly, whereas participants who displayed implicit disliking for the elderly were more likely to walk fast. Such findings suggest that participants were motivated to prepare for social interactions af ter the activation of social categories. These effects a re not restricted to common social groups, but social groups tend to be among the dimensions of social life that provide clear and consensual stereotypes a nd may be particularly effective at producing a connection to oneself.
Self-Motives and Goal Pursuits
As illustrated in the work we just described, research on self a nd identity over the past two decades has put a greater emphasis tha n before on the motivational mechanisms that propel social behavior. Relevant to our aims in the present chapter, research suggests that defending one's self-view may stem from a discrepancy between implicit a nd explicit self-esteem. Of particular interest is the case of individuals who hold relatively high explicit sel f-esteem and relatively low implicit self-esteem. This form of discrepa ncy has been characterized as defensive high selfesteem (as compared to secure high selfesteem) because these individuals tend to have high levels of narcissism a nd to engage in defensive behaviors includ ing intergroup biases (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003) . As a result of the discrepancy in implicit and explicit self-esteem, in-1 66 I. AWARENF:S5, COGNITION, A NO REGULATION dividua ls may be motivated to denigrate outgroups when they are threatened, in order to feel better about themselves. Ironica lly, this phenomenon is likely to occu r when European America n participa nts are told that the IAT assesses racial bias (Frantz, Cuddy, with an achievement goal performed better on an achievement task and were more likely to persist at the task than individuals who were not primed with such a goal ( Ba rgh, ·Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Ba rndollar, & Trotschel, 2001 ). In the same vein, when Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004) . Under these circu msta nces, pa rticipants showed greater racial bias tha n did pa rticipants who believed that the IAT assessed cultural bias. When the discrepa ncy between implicit and explicit self-esteem seeps into consciousness, individuals may experience self-dou bts and may engage in enha nced processing of discrepancy-related i nformation to resolve the discrepa ncy (Briiiol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006) . To relieve thei r doubts, they may pay more careful attention to relevant in formation i n order to better understa nd the reasons for the discrepa ncy. The discrepa ncy between implicit and explicit self-esteem might be exacerbated under threatening situations. For instance, when male participants were told that they were gender-deviant or experienced social rejection, they showed an increase in their implicit self-esteem but not in their explicit self-esteem, suggesting that implicit self-esteem compensation may serve to protect the self and may reduce anxiety ( Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007) . Although the psychological underpi nnings of implicit-explicit discrepa ncies in selfevaluations are not fully understood yet, growi ng evidence suggests that the combination of high explicit self-esteem and low implicit self-esteem fosters defensiveness and compensatory self-enhancement activities (see also Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill Jordan, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2009) .
In terms of goals, work based on Bargh's (1990) auto-motives model is cent rally relevant to the present discussion, beginning with the idea that goal pursuits can occur automatically and nonconsciously. Goals activated outside of awareness, control, or intention are pursued similarly to goals chosen through deliberate or conscious mea ns. For example, Chartra nd a nd demonstrated that information-processing goals, such as impression formation or memorization, can be automatically activated and pursued. Individuals primed nonconsciously primed with various interpersonal relationships, people pursued goals related to those relationships, such as u nderstandi ng their , relationship partners' behaviors ( Fitzsi mons & Bargh, 2003) . For example, although people have a strong tendency to generate dispositional (vs. situational) explanations for others' behavior, there is evidence that when properly motivated, people can overcome this tendency. In addition, people may be especially motivated to find situational expla nations for their close relationshi p pa rtners' behavior. Thus, when subl iminally primed with their best friend's na me, people were more likely to search for situational (vs. dispositional) causes for behavior in a n u nrelated attribution task. In other words, the mere psychological presence of a relationship c partner led people to engage i n goal-d irected behavior.
Researchers have documented bounda ry conditions of goal-priming effects. For ex-, ample, ind ividuals ceased to pursue nonconsciously primed goals when these goals were coactivated with negatively valenced information (Aa rts, Custers, & Hol l and, 2007). Thus, not only can goa l-d irected behaviors be initiated outside of conscious awareness or control, but the cessation of goal-directed behaviors can be triggered by the nonconi scious processi ng of affective information.
Overall, the research reviewed here highlights the similarities between conscious and s nonconscious self-motives or goals, with implications for interpreting resea rch using implicit measurement. Research on self and i identity has documented the pervasiveness of e self-presenta tional concerns (Leary, 1995) , and a common claim is that techniques as- 
Societal and Cultural Foundations
We now turn our attention to the influence of societal and cultural factors on implicit identities. We have indicated already that stereotypes about social groups have an impact on the implicit self. Similarly, automatic associations involving the self often reflect an internalization of cultural stereotypes. We begin with the premise that more often than not, relations between groups are hierarchically organized (Sida nius & Pratto, 1999). In other words, social groups rarely occupy interchangea ble positions, and groups that enjoy greater social favors usually remain in that position for extended periods, whatever may be the criteria that cha racterize the hierarchy (e.g., numerical status, social status, or power).
What is the impact of these factors on social identities? To what extent do members of dominant and subordinate groups exhibit a preference for their own group? On this issue, contrasting predictions can be formulated. On the one hand, one would expect that members of suborgillate groups engage in more ingroup bias than members of dominant groups. This would be consistent with the idea that people in subordinate groups have a stronger need to achieve a positive social identity, which should be satisfied by increasing favorable intergroup distinctions. On the other ha nd, we might hypothesize that members of subordinate groups are less likely than members of dominant groups to display a preference for their group because social conditions consistently impose a less favorable evaluation of the subordinate group. At least in the case of ethnic comparisons in the United States, the evidence at hand seems to support the first alternative. For instance, African America ns often display more ethnocentric intergroup perceptions than European Americans (e.g., Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995) .
However, a different pattern of findings has emerged with some regularity when implicit social identity has been examined. Data collected though the Project Implicit website (implicit.harvard .edu) provide some insights on this issue ( Nosek, Smyth, et al., 2007): On a measu re of explicit attitudes, European America n respondents reported a preference for the group "European Americans" over the group "African America ns" (d = 0.55), and Africa n America n respondents reported an opposite and even stronger preference for their own group (d = -0.93). The strong explicit liking reported by Africa n American respondents stands in sharp contrast to performa nce on the implicit measure. Unlike Eu ropean America n respondents, who continued to show a strong preference for "Europea n Americans" over "African Americans" on the implicit measure of attitudes ( d = 1.00), African American respondents showed no such systematic
Results from laboratory data confirm and extend these findings ( Livingston, 2002) : African Americans who believed that their group was held in low regard by mainstream American society did not exhibit an ingroup bias at the implicit level, only at the explicit level. African American students exhibited implicit liking and identification with their own ethnic group only when they believed that European Americans held African Americans in positive regard. In another intergroup context, Jost, Pelha m, and Carvallo (2002) found that students from both high-and low-status u niversities implicitly associated academic characteristics with the higher-stat us group, and extracurricular activities with the lower-stat us group. Moreover, students from the high-status university exhibited significant ingroup favoritism on an implicit measure, whereas students from the low-status university did not. When dominant group members were compared to minority group members based on race, religion, appearance, a nd social class, dominant group members showed more implicit ingroup preferences than minority group members, but this difference was largest between the rich (highest-status group} a nd poor (lowest-status group} ( Rudma n, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002) .
Together, these findings illustrate that ingroup favoritism is moderated by sociocultural evaluations of social groups. On explicit measures, disadva ntaged group members exert effort to report positive attitudes, but the lower social standing of their group is sufficiently interna lized that they do not show an implicit preference for 168 L AWAFU'Nf SS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION their own group. On the other ha nd, advantaged group mem bers' preferences show the combi ned benefit of both ingroup liking and the sociocultural adva ntage assigned to thei r group. Such results are consistent with the notion of system justification (Jost, Ba naji, & Nosek, 2004) , or the idea that beyond ego justification and group justification lies the more insidious tendency to justify the system or status quo, even when it reflects poorly on one's self or group. Members of domina nt groups share thoughts, feel ings, and behaviors that reinforce a nd legitimize existing socia l systems, which is i n their interest but, surprisingl y, so do members of less dominant groups. Examples reviewed in this section indicate that ideologica l bolsteri ng can occu r outside conscious awareness, and this prevents perceivers and even targets of prejud ice from questioning the legitimacy of social arrangements. It has been argued that resea rch underestimates ingroup favoritism among low-status groups because the most widely used measure of group attitudes, the TAT, is influenced by extrapersonal associations or cultural k nowledge and, as such, is not tapping personal attitudes (Olson, Crawford, & Devlin, 2009 ). However, this alternative interpretation assumes a clear separation between cultural and persona l knowledge that overshadows the societal foundations of impl icit associations (Banaji, 2001) .
Very little resea rch has analyzed the relationship between self a nd identities that may be in conflict. We have chosen to study these by examining the interconnections between ethnic a nd national identities. The United States is a perfect testing ground because it is a plura list society composed of identifiable ethnic groups that va ry in length of association, immersion into mainstrea m culture, and conditions of immigration. We investigated the extent to which ethnic groups a re implicitly conceived as being pa rt of America in a culture that explicitly holds that a ll groups should be treated equally. We assumed that the hierarchy present in America n society would structu re associations between ethnicity and America n identity (Sidanius & Petroci k, 2001) . We hypothesized that European America ns would be unconsciously viewed as being more essentially American and as exemplif ying the nation, whereas ethnic minorities would be placed psychologically at the ma rgins.
Using techniques developed to assess implicit associations, we examined the extent to which various ethnic groups were associated with the concept "America n" (relative to "foreign"). For example, we asked participants to pair, as quickly as possi ble, American or foreign symbols (e.g., flags, maps, coins, monuments) with faces that varied in ethnicity but were clea rly understood to be America n. Although pa rticipants were aware that all individuals were America n, irrespective of ethnicity, the data consistently ind icated that European America ns were more strongly associated with the concept "American" than were Asian Americans, Africa n America ns, Latinos, and even Native Americans (Devos & Ba naji, 2005; Devos, Gavin, & Quinta na, 2010; Devos & Heng, 2009; Devos & Ma, 2008; Nosek, Smyth, et al., 2007; Rydell, Hamilton, & Devos, 2010) . Such implicit associations are sometimes consi:;tent with people's explicit beliefs. For example, Asia n America ns and Latinos are viewed as less American than Europea n Americans at both explicit a nd implicit levels of responding.
In other cases, discrepancies between explicit a nd implicit beliefs emerged. For example, in a domain such as track and field sports, black athletes were expl icitly more strongly associated with the category "America n" tha n were white athletes, but at an automatic level, it remained easier to link the concept "American" with white athletes tha n with black athletes (Devos & Banaji, 2005) . This America n = white effect was obtained even when known Asian American exempla rs were contrasted to known white foreigners: Even though people were fully aware that someone such as Kate Winslet is not American, and that Lucy Liu is American, the white + American connection was not eradicated (Devos & Ma, 2008) . We conclude from these studies that the national identity of being American is associated with the ethnic identity of being white, and even when it is consciously rejected, this association is strong at the implicit level.
Research examining the impact of participants' ethnic identity on implicit ethnicAmerica n associations has revealed that Asia n American and Latino participants showing an internalization that is detrimental to their personal and group interests (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos et al., 2010) . Indeed, such implicit associations potentially hu rt their national identity. African American participants, on the other ha nd, perceived their own group to be as American as the dominant group. In addition, the propensity to link "white" and "American" was positively correlated with the strength of national identification (self + American) for Europea n American participants, but it was not related to national identifica tion for Asian American and Latino pa rticipa nts (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos et al., 2010) . In other words, ethnic-national associations account for the merging of ethnic and national identifications for Europea n Americans, but there is a relative dissociation between ethnic and national attachments for Asian America ns and Latinos.
Interestingly, similar research conducted in New Zeala nd revealed a different pattern of ethnic-national associations (Si bley & Liu, 2007) . Europea n and Maori New Zealanders were explicitly and implicitly equally associated with the New Zealand national identity. There was a small tendency for Europea n New Zealanders to associate thei r ingroup more strongly with the national identity, but this effect disappeared when pictures of famous European and Maori rugby players were used as stimuli. Variations across ethnic groups or national contexts are consistent with the notion that i mplicit associations are rooted in experiences, bear the mark of cultural sociali zation, and reflect sociocultural realities.
Research on culture and self-concept shows that members of different cu ltures often define and evaluate the self in different ways (Cross & Gore, Chapter 27, this volume) . A major distinction in cross-cu ltural psychology is between collectivist and individualist societies (Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990) . In collectivist cultures, people define themselves as mem bers of groups, subordinate their personal goals to group goals, and show strong emotional attach ment to the group. In individualist cultures, people place a strong emphasis on self-reliance, individ ual achievement, and personal goals.
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In their work on the self-concept, Ma rkus and Kitayama (1991) argued tha t the self is defined in terms of interdependence in Asia n cultures. Inother words, the self is i n herentl y collective in these cultu res. In contrast, the typically Western conception of self is one in which individuals see themselves as d isti nct and independent from others. In a pioneering series of studies, Hetts, Sakuma, and Pelham (1999) used this distinction to compare the implicit and explicit self-concepts of people who va ried in their exposure to individualistic cultu res bu t were currently living in the same cult u re. They exa mined the extent to which explicit and impl icit self-eva luations of recent Asia n immigrants differed f rom those of Europea n America ns and Asian America ns rea red in the Un ited States. At the explicit level, they found little d ifference between these groups. J n pa rticu la r, Easterners emigrating to a Western cu lture seemed to endorse the kind of selfconcept promoted in individua l istic societies. However, a different pictu re emerged at the implicit level. Using response latency and word-completion techniques, Hetts and colleagues found strong d ifferences between groups in terms of personal versus group regard. For people rea red i n a n individ ualistic cu ltu re, ideas that were automa tically associated with the individ ual and collective identities were relatively positive. For people socialized in a collectivistic cu lture, the group or collective identity automatically elicited positive thoughts, but ideas tied to individua l identity were neutral, am bivalent, or even negative. Such d iscoveries are consistent with the idea that the need for positive self-regard is expressed through social or collective identities in some cu ltures, and in individualistic ways i n others. The cultu ra l context can overshadow differences in cultura l experiences when measured th rough explicit self-evaluations, but implicit selfevaluations reveal the mark of cultural social ization.
More recent investigations have focused on culture and self-esteem, and the overa ll pattern is that at the explici t level, Westerners have higher self-esteem than East Asians, whereas at the i mpl ici t level, there a re no significa nt cross-cultu ral d ifferences In summary, find ings on self-enha ncement and self-esteem point to differential cultural influences on the content of implicit attitudes about the self a nd the explicit expression of those attitudes. These results may be ta ken as evidence that implicit self-evaluations a re less influenced by normative demands than their explicit counterpa rts. This being said, researchers a re only beginning to grasp the complexities of cultural influences on implicit and explicit self-definitions, and work in this area often challenges common assumptions about cultural differences (e.g., Kitayama & Uchida, 2003; Kobayashi & Greenwa ld, 2003) .
Implicit and Explicit Self-Concept
So far, we have emphasized research demonstrating that self-related processes can occur unconsciously or automatically. On several occasions, we have pointed out that findings at the implicit level converge with observations based on self-report measures. In other cases, we have stressed the fact that investigations of unconscious or automatic processes reveal a different picture tha n assessments of explicit self-concepts or identities. In this section, we examine how implicit a nd explicit self-related processes might be intertwined.
According to a recent meta-a nalysis, on average, the magnitude of the relationship between implicit and explicit measures is small (Hof mann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005) . More importantly, there is sometimes extreme variability in the magnitude of correlations between implicit and explicit measures, pointing to the need to identif y factors moderating the relationship (Nosek, 2005) . Self-presentation is the attempt to alter or mask a response for social or personal purposes, and people may be motivated to hide an identity that they do not want others to know for a va riety of reasons (e.g., a Republican student on a liberal college campus, a gay man who has not revealed his sexual orientation at work}. Because implicit measures are less vulnerable to deliberate control tha n explicit measures, when self-presentation concerns are high, the discrepa ncy between implicit a nd explicit reports is expected to increase. Another possible moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit measures is the dimensionality or structure of the construct being assessed. Research conducted on the evaluations of a wide range of social objects has documented a greater correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes when the attitude objects could be evaluated along a bipolar continuum (e.g., gun control vs. gun rights) tha n when they could not be appraised using a simple structure (e.g., being pro-women does not imply being antimen; Nosek, 2005) . From an informationprocessing perspective, responses regarding attitudes or identities with a simple, bipolar structure are easier and faster to ma ke, whereas multidimensional attitudes or identities are more complex, less stable, and more difficult to retrieve. Thus, when the identity being assessed is multidimensional, a discrepa ncy between implicit and explicit measures is more likely to be found.
In the domain of self a nd identity, most studies have examined the correspondence between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem. For example, Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker (2000) examined the correlations between various measures of implicit and explicit self-esteem. Although some ' implicit measures correlated significa ntly with explicit measures, the magnitude of the observed correlations was relatively small (all r' s > .27). Using confirmatory factor analysis, Greenwa ld and Farnha m (2000) demonstrated that implicit self-esteem and . explicit self-esteem were distinct constructs (positively, but weakly, correlated). In addition, different measures of implicit selfesteem are often weakly intercorrelated, raising questions about their convergent validity a nd the dimensionality of the construct of implicit self-esteem ( Rudolph, Schroder-Abe, Schutz, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2008; Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007) . However, Oakes, Brown, and Cai (2008) found a greater correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem when the implicit measure was based on self-releva nt (vs. self-neutral) stimuli and the explicit measure captured the affective (vs. cognitive) component of self-esteem.
Several studies support the idea that, under some circumstances, self-descriptions may switch from a controlled mode to an automatic mode. For example, more positive automatic self-eva luations are obtained when pa rticipants are emotionally aroused or when their attentional capacity is reduced due to increased cognitive load ( Paulhus, Graf, & Va n Selst, 1989; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987) . In related research, Koole and colleagues (2001) found that the opportunity to engage in conscious self-reflection affected the degree of congruence between implicit self-esteem a nd self-reported evaluations of the self. For example, slow selfevaluations were less congruent with implicit self-evaluation tha n fast self-evaluations. Similarly, when participants were under high cognitive load, implicit self-eva luations predicted self-reported evaluations, but that was not the case when cognitive resources were available (low cognitive load). These findings support the idea that when the capacity or the motivation to engage in conscious self-reflection is low, implicit, automatic self-evaluations are activated. More recently, Jordan, Whitfield, a nd Ziegler-Hill (2007) have shown that trust in one's intuitions moderates the relationship between implicit a nd explicit self-esteem: People who have faith in their intuitions (i.e., who are more likely to view their intuitions as valid) display more consistent implicit and explicit self-esteem than people who have less faith in their intuitions.
In summary, the evidence suggests that implicit and explicit self-concepts are distinct constructs, a lthough, at least under some circumstances, connections may be detected.
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An importa nt challenge for future research is to understand the simila rities and differences between implicit and explicit measures of self and identity, and to identif y the circumstances under which these two types of measures yield convergent versus divergent responses. In this spirit, researchers have started to explore the predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem or self-concept. In a pioneering experiment, Spalding and Hardin (1999) found that implicit self-esteem accounted for the extent to which pa rticipants behaved anxiously in an interview situation (as rated by the interviewer). Explicit self-esteem did not predict participants' apparent anxiety, but it was related to pa rticipa nts' own ratings of anxiety. In a similar vein, Asendorpf, Banse, and Mucke (2002) showed that an implicit measure of self-concept (self + shy association) accounted for sponta neous behavioral responses in a realistic situation, whereas a pa rallel explicit measure did not. These findings demonstrate the predictive va lidity of implicit measures of self-concept a nd attitude (see also Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009; Egloff, & Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlma nn, & Banaji, 2009 ).
Conclusion
The question of how we know ourselves and what we know about ourselves is of fundamental interest to understa nding how self-knowledge is represented, the degree to which such knowledge is constructed in social context, and its implications for health and well-being. Yet the epistemological quagmire inherent in the empirical assessment of knowledge about oneself has always posed a problem, as noted at the start of this chapter. We suggested that analyses of unconscious self-processes may assist in this regard, and we focused on the social aspect of self a nd identity, focusing our attention on a particular aspect of the self-one that emerges in the context of social group memberships. From the initial research using implicit or indirect measures of self and identity, we already have evidence about the role of social group membership in creating a sense of self and self-worth.
The work reviewed in this chapter raised issues that a re increasingly incorporated into our u nderstanding of the self. Processes that capture group identity can operate without introspective access or deliberative thought. Group identity and even knowledge about social groups (that is automatically learned even if consciously denied) can have indirect influences on people's judgments about themselves. An u nspoken assumption has been that implicit attitudes, beliefs, and motives about oneself are hard to change given that they are overlearned associations about a well-known object. Several findings reported in this chapter would suggest, to the contrary, that implicit associations are not rigid, and that shif ts in self-definitions and self-evaluations can occur without conscious awareness or intention. Situational or contextual manipulations reveal the plasticity of self-related impl icit social cognition. Finally, severa l lines of research reported in th is chapter show the subtle but crucial ways in which sociocultural varia bles shape selfrelated mental processes. In many instances, sociostructural influences on psychological processes become more obvious when research is focused on the n itty-gritty of mental processes that are not consciously accessible but may nevertheless be found using indirect measures. In that regard, work on implicit processes promises to renew thinking about the obvious interplay among the psychological and the social, the individual, and the collective. 
